Monday, February 26, 2007

Understanding Evolution

reposted from: clipmarks.com
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clipped from: evolution.berkeley.edu
Understanding%20Evolution:%20your%20one-stop%20source%20for%20information%20on%20evolution


Browse%20by%20topic

How%20evolution%20works What is evolution and how does it work?
Detailed explanations of the mechanisms of evolution and the history of life on Earth
Includes: Examples of evolution, Genetics, History of life on Earth, Macroevolution, Microevolution, Natural selection, Speciation ...
Relevance%20of%20evolution How does evolution impact my life?
The relevance of evolutionary theory to our everyday lives
Includes: Agriculture, Conservation, Medicine ...
Evidence%20and%20examples What is the evidence for evolution?
Multiple lines of scientific evidence relating to evolution
Includes: Homology and analogy ...
History%20of%20evolutionary%20thought What is the history of evolutionary theory?
The history of ideas, research, and contributors in the study of evolution


Looking for information on controversies in the public arena relating to evolution? See our frequently-asked questions.



reef

Where species come from - November 2006
Cries of "Save the rainforest! Save the coral reefs!" may rally the conservation movement — but what about the arctic tundra, or the semiarid desert? Are those ecosystems unthreatened? Far from it; ecosystems all around the world and at every latitude are endangered in some way by human activity. So why do rainforests and reefs get so much attention?

Read the whole story to see the evolution connection >>


highlights


Phylogenetic%20systematics%2C%20a.k.a.%20evolutionary%20trees Phylogenetic systematics, a.k.a. evolutionary trees
All life on Earth is united by evolutionary history; we are all evolutionary cousins — twigs on the tree of life. Phylogenetic systematics is the formal name for the field within biology that reconstructs evolutionary history and studies the patterns of relationships among organisms.

Evo%20101 Evolution 101
This in-depth, multi-part course takes you through evolutionary theory and mechanisms, from definitions to details, natural selection to genetic drift, mutations to punctuated equilibrium

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The Elegant Universe - by Brian Greene

reposted from: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/elegant/program_d.html

Look at the 3 hour programme hosted by Brian Greene.

Breathtaking Galaxy Pics

clipped from: images.lunarpages.com
http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2006/46/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2006/39/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2006/35/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2006/14/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2006/10/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2006/03/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2005/37/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2005/12/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2005/01/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2004/27/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2004/23/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2004/10/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2004/04/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2003/09/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2003/11/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2002/21/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2001/28/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2001/16/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2001/10/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2000/07/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/2000/08/

http://hubblesite.org/newscenter/archive/1999/41/

1-15-2007 7:27 PMclipped by CrazyRedHead
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Space Balls. An accurate model of Planets to Sun etc

clipped from: webisto.com






I posted a similar post here. Awesome!

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10 Most Impressive Photos of our Universe

10 Most Impressive Photos of our Universe

Eskimo Nebula


The Eskimo Nebula (NGC 2392), also known as the Clownface Nebula, was discovered by astronomer William Herschel in 1787. From the ground, it resembles a person's head surrounded by a parka hood. In 2000, the Hubble Space Telescope produced this image of it. From space, the nebula displays gas clouds so complex that they are not fully understood.

The Eskimo Nebula is clearly a planetary nebula. It is surrounded by gas that composed the outer layers of a Sun-like star only 10,000 years ago. The visible inner filaments are ejected by strong wind of particles from the central star. The outer disk contains unusual light-year long orange filaments. NGC 2392 lies about 5000 light-years away and is visible with a small telescope in the constellation of Gemini.

Pillars of Creation


This Hubble image, showing star forming pillars in the Eagle Nebula, is one of the most popular poster images of outer space, and often appears in science-fiction movies. The Eagle Nebula was one of the space regions passed through during the opening "zoom out" shot of the movie Contact (1997), and appeared in the opening scene of the Babylon 5 episode Into The Fire. The Eagle Nebula, along with the Hourglass Nebula, was featured in the liner notes of Pearl Jam's 2000 album Binaural.

Pale Blue Dot


"Pale Blue Dot" is the name of THIS famous Voyager 1 photograph of Earth, and the title of a book by Carl Sagan inspired by the photo. On February 14, 1990, NASA commanded the Voyager 1 spacecraft, having completed its primary mission, to turn around to photograph the planets it had visited. NASA ultimately compiled 60 images from this unique event into a mosaic of the Solar System. One image Voyager returned was of Earth, 4 billion miles distant, showing up as a "pale blue dot" in the grainy photo. Britt describes the distance as "more than 4 billion miles". The picture was taken using a narrow-angle camera at 32ยบ above the ecliptic, and created using blue, green, and violet filters. Narrow-angle cameras, as opposed to wide-angle cameras, are equipped to photograph specific details in an area of interest. In addition, only 0.12 pixels represents Earth in the photo.

Sagan said the famous Earthrise picture taking during the Apollo 8 mission, showing the entire Earth above the moon, forced humans to step back and see the Earth as just a part of the universe. In the spirit of that realization, Sagan said he pushed for Voyager to take a photo of the Earth from its vantage point on the edge of the solar system.

There was danger to the spacecraft's optics from the nearby Sun. Voyager took similar pictures of Venus, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune. Thus the Pale Blue Dot photo was part of a "portait" of the Solar System that was created by Voyager 1.


Supernova 1987A


SN 1987A was a supernova in the outskirts of the Tarantula Nebula in the Large Magellanic Cloud, a nearby dwarf galaxy. It occurred approximately 51.4 kiloparsecs from Earth, close enough that it was visible to the naked eye. It was the closest supernova since SN 1604, which occurred in the Milky Way itself. The light from the supernova reached Earth on February 23, 1987. As the first supernova discovered in 1987, it was labeled "1987A". Its brightness peaked in May with an apparent magnitude of about 3 and slowly declined in the following months. It was the first opportunity for modern astronomers to see a supernova up close.

Since 51.4 kiloparsecs is approximately 168,000 light-years, the cosmic event itself happened approximately 168,000 years ago. To put this in perspective, Homo sapiens sapiens (modern humans) evolved about 200,000 years ago.


Antennae Galaxies


Hubble produced this image in October 1997. The Antennae Galaxies (also known as NGC 4038/NGC 4039) are a pair of galaxies about 68 million ly away in the constellation Corvus. They were both discovered by Friedrich Wilhelm Herschel in 1785.

The chaotic swirls of blues and oranges represent a firestorm of new star birth ignited by the head-on collision of interstellar hydrogen. The long arcing insect-like "antennae" represent matter flung from the scene of the accident.





Hubble Deep Field


The Hubble Deep Field (HDF) is an image of a small region in the constellation Ursa Major, based on the results of a series of observations by the Hubble Space Telescope. It covers an area 144 arcseconds across, equivalent in angular size to a tennis ball at a distance of 100 metres. The image was assembled from 342 separate exposures taken with the Space Telescope's Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2 over ten consecutive days between December 18 and December 28, 1995.

The field is so small that only a few foreground stars in the Milky Way lie within it; thus, almost all of the 3,000 objects in the image are galaxies, some of which are among the youngest and most distant known. By revealing such large numbers of very young galaxies, the HDF has become a landmark image in the study of the early universe, and it has been the source of almost 400 scientific papers since it was created.


Crab Nebula


The Crab Nebula (catalogue designations M1, NGC 1952, Taurus A) is a supernova remnant in the constellation of Taurus. The nebula was first observed in 1731 by John Bevis. It is the remnant of a supernova that was recorded by Chinese and Arab astronomers in 1054. Located at a distance of about 6,300 light years (2 kpc) from Earth, the nebula has a diameter of 11 ly (3.4 pc) and is expanding at a rate of about 1,500 kilometres per second.

The nebula contains a pulsar in its centre which rotates thirty times per second, emitting pulses of radiation from gamma rays to radio waves. The nebula was the first astronomical object identified with a historical supernova explosion.


Cat's Eye Nebula


The Cat's Eye Nebula (NGC 6543) is a planetary nebula in the constellation of Draco. Structurally, it is one of the most complex nebulae known, with high-resolution Hubble Space Telescope observations revealing remarkable structures such as knots, jets and sinewy arc-like features. It was discovered by William Herschel on February 15, 1786, and was the first planetary nebula whose spectrum was investigated, by the English amateur astronomer William Huggins in 1864.

Modern studies reveal several mysteries. The intricacy of the structure may be caused in part by material ejected from a binary central star, but as yet, there is no direct evidence that the central star has a companion. Also, measurements of chemical abundances reveal a large discrepancy between measurements done by two different methods, the cause of which is uncertain.


Gamma Ray Explosion


The Hubble Space Telescope captured this image of a gamma ray explosion [shown at two different scales] on January 23, 1999. At the time it was the most powerful explosion ever recorded.

According to NASA, gammaray bursts "may represent the most powerful explosions in the universe since the Big Bang, the explosive birth of our universe. Hubble images showed that these brief flashes of radiation come from far-flung galaxies that are forming stars at enormously high rates. By pinpointing the host galaxies, Hubble also identified the sources of the 'bursts': the collapse of massive stars."


Protoplanetary Disks


A Hubble Space Telescope image shows "proplyds," or protoplanetary disks, in the Orion Nebula.

According to NASA, nebulae, flattened disks of gas and dust, "are the likely birthplaces of new planetary systems. Hubble provided visual proof that pancake-shaped dust disks around young stars are common, suggesting that the building blocks for planet formation are in place."

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What scientists believe and what they can prove (with a flowchart for Sir Karl Popper) - Janet D. Stemwedel

Posted on: February 26, 2007 1:12 PM, by Janet D. Stemwedel

On the post in which I resorted to flowcharts to try to unpack people's claims about the process involved in building scientific knowledge, Torbjรถrn Larsson raised a number of concerns:

The first problem I have was with "belief". I have seen, and forgotten, that it is used in two senses in english - for trust, and for conviction. Rather like for theory, the weaker term isn't appropriate here. I would say that theories gives us trust in repeatability of predicted observations, and that kind of trust counts as knowledge. In fact, already the trust repeated observations gives count as knowledge.

The second problem I have is with "the problem of induction". Science has a set of procedures that observably generates robust knowledge, and the alleged problem is seldom seen. When the terrain and the map doesn't agree, junk the map.

The third problem I have is with the specific diagrams. Real scientific knowledge production will not yield to any one diagram. So for the philosopher that raises a hypothetical "problem of induction" we could turn around the question and ask why the obvious "problem of description" (which ironically is a real problem of induction :-) isn't bothersome. The scientist answer would probably be as above: "e puor si muove".

... Without feeling like testability is the end-all of science the diagram is slanted away from testing towards a weaker and in the end nonfunctional descriptive science. Whether we call tested knowledge "a conclusion" or "a tentative conclusion" is irrelevant IMHO, it is a conclusion we will (have to) trust in.

The fourth (oy!) problem I have is with the conflated description the diagram alludes to. In the text there is a distinction between individual scientists and the scientific enterprise. Different entities will obviously use different approaches to knowledge, and if the individual doesn't need to trust her findings the enterprise relies on such a trust.

These are reasonable concerns, so let me say a few words to address them.

I'll start with the fourth concern, the relation between what's going on with the individual scientist and the larger community of scientists working together to build knowledge. While some thinkers have framed the problem of building objective knowledge as one that depends on each individual scientist being highly objective and switching off his or her own biases, others (including Frederick Grinnell and Helen E. Longino) have put theburden of objectivity primarily with the community -- bias is stripped out of what ends up being identified as scientific knowledge when the community "checks the work" of individual scientists within it.

Myself, I'm inclined to think that the community has an easier time being more objective when each of the individuals within that community is doing his or her best to be aware of, and unmoved by, his or her own biases. This may be psychologically challenging, but it's not impossible. Certainly, the process of trying to persuade other scientists that you've found something interesting puts you in touch with the idea that others in your community may not share your hunches.

So, it might be advisable to have different flowcharts for what the individual scientist is doing and what the scientific community is doing. But given that each individual scientist is (or might be) striving to be as hardheadedly objective as the community of individual scientists working in concert, we might be able to get away with using the community-level process as an idealized model of the individual-level process.

Torbjรถrn Larsson's third concern is also related to the worry that a lot is being idealized in these charts -- that the actual process of building scientific knowledge "on the ground" is messy and can't be properly captured in a single road map. I agree. It's best to think of the flowcharts as trying to capture the process of justifying scientific claims, not the process by which you come up with them or get the experiment to work or what have you.

And justification is the issue at the heart of the problem of induction, which seems to be the sticking point in Torbjรถrn Larsson's second and first concerns. What is it that make a claim count as scientific knowledge? There is an operational kind of answer to this question: here are the steps you need to take to support your claim in order for scientists to regard it as playing a particular role in the scientific discourse (whether you want to identify the claim thus supported as "credible" or "convincing" or "the best available explanation of the phenomena" or something else).

But there's also a bare-knuckles logical warrant sort of answer to this question, and this is where the problem of induction comes in. The problem of induction is a worry if you think knowledge ought to come down to claims about which you need entertain no doubts. If you want your claim to be unsinkable before you call it knowledge, then you can't laugh the problem of induction off as a mere philosophical trifle.

The observations we've gathered so far don't provide empirical evidence about the observations we haven't yet made. As regular as the phenomena in the universe seem to be, we've only observed a fraction of all the things we could observe, and no one set of inferences we could draw from the data now in evidence is the only set of inferences that fit these data.

Sir Karl Popper didn't see the problem of induction -- that inductive inferences drawn from limited data could go wrong -- as something that could be "solved". However, he thought that the methodology of science avoided the problem by not identifying conclusions arrived at through inductive inference as "knowledge" in the strong sense of "there is no way this could fail to be true". Here's Popper's picture of the process of building scientific knowledge:

Notice that Popper doesn't think it matters all that much where your hypothesis P comes from. Maybe it comes from lots of poking around and observing your phenomena. Maybe it comes from that recurring nightmare of the snake biting his own tail. It's not important. The thing that can make P a respectable scientific claim is that it is tested in the right kind of way.

How it is tested, for Popper, comes down to working out the observable consequences that would follow if P were true and especially the things we should not be able to observe if P is false. With these predictions in hand, you make your observations. If your observations don't match with your predictions from P, they let you deduce that P cannot be true, and you achieve as much certainty as you can hope for. Since your conclusion that not-P is the conclusion of a deductive argument, you can bet the farm on it.

If, on the other hand, the observations match your predictions from P, Popper says that you haven't established P with certainty (since you come to P at the conclusion of an inductive argument, and new evidence might undermine that conclusion). So, you go through the whole process again. You can't, as far as Popper is concerned, conclude on the basis of all manner of successful observations (and an utter lack of observations that contradict P) that P is true -- just that it has (so far) survived all attempts at falsifying it.

Does taking Popper seriously mean that scientists can't ever draw positive conclusions? I don't think so. The fact that scientists acknowledge that their conclusions are tentative and could be updated in the face of future data strikes me as an acknowledgment that they recognize that inductive inference doesn't come with a guarantee. This recognition doesn't mean you're not allowed to use inductive inference, but rather that you have to be at least a little cautious about the weight you place on the conclusions derawn with it.

To the extent that using induction has generated pictures of the world that hold up to scientific scrutiny, inductive inference is a useful tool. Success to date is not, of course, a guarantee that inductive inference will always work, any more than the fact that the phenomena in our world seem reassuringly regular is a guarantee that they will remain so.

"Conviction" for a scientist, then, is not: "From this day forward, I am committed to P and nothing you could show me will ever shake my commitment to P." Instead, we have something like: "Given the data amassed, and the stringent tests which P has passed, and the current lack of other claims that fit the phenomena as well and have held up as well to our testing, I'm committed to P. I'd be surprised if the situation were to change, but it could, in which case, I may update my view."

For a belief to become a scientific conviction seems to require certain kinds of justification (from empirical data, theories, etc.). A belief without that kind of justification behind it is just a belief -- nothing wrong with that, but it has no special status in scientific discussions. The problem of induction is concerned with what we can prove. It's a matter of logic. To the extent that scientists find it fruitful to draw inductive inferences, they can, so long as they recognize (as they generally do) that the careful justifications that they offer don't quite meet the level of deductive proof. Still, they are good justifications, and a claim backed by these will be on better scientific footing than a claim without such justifications.


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Atheism quotes via Clipmarks.com

clipped from: www.delawareonline.com
I cannot believe in a God who wants to be praised all the time.
-Friedrich Nietzsche

I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.
-Stephen Roberts

I still say a church steeple with a lightning rod on top shows a lack of confidence.
-Doug McLeod

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?
-Epicurus

Science is like a blabbermouth who ruins a movie by telling you how it ends! Well I say there are some things we don't want to know! Important things!
-Ned Flanders

Men never commit evil so fully and joyfuly as when they do it for religious convictions.
-Blaise Pascal

So far as I can remember, there is not one word in the Gospels in praise of intelligence.
-Bertrand Russell

Praying is like a rocking chair-- it'll give you something to do, but it won't get you anywhere.
-Gypsy Rose Lee

We must question the story logic of having an all-knowing all-powerful God, who creates faulty Humans, and then blames them for his own mistakes.
-Gene Roddenberry

If a church sign says it, then it must be so:

http://shortthorts.blogspot.com/2006/10/fun-with-church-signs.html

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Scientific and unscientific conclusions: now with pictures! - Janet D. Stemwedel

Posted on: February 24, 2007 9:21 PM, by Janet D. Stemwedel

This is another attempt to get to the bottom of what's bugging people about the case of Marcus Ross, Ph.D. in geosciences and Young Earth Creationist. Here, I've tried to distill the main hypotheticals from my last post on the issue into flowcharts*, in the hopes that this will make it easier for folks to figure out just what they want to say about the proper way to build scientific knowledge..

First, here's the process that no one thinks is a good description of how to come to a scientific conclusion:

Believing something doesn't make it so. Science is an endeavor that is not concerned with what a person believes about the world but instead with what one can establish about the world, usually on the basis of emprical evidence.

The worrisome thing about the Marcus Ross case was that his YEC committed him to views (e.g., the Earth is at most 10,000 years old) that directly conflict with claims made in his disseration about the abundance and spread of marine reptiles which disappeared about 65 million years ago. He seems to be claiming not-P while believing P, and that seems a lot like lying. This is why I labored through the doppelganger-Ross post to try to work out whether it's even possible to build good scientific knowledge while believing (for completely non-scientific reasons) the opposite.

My commenters seemed divided on this. In the "unlikely it's possible" column, we have Brian:

... as a scientist, you're committed to the idea that the most parsimonious explanation is likely the truth.

and Larry Moran:

The Earth is billions of years old. That's not a theory, it's a fact. (Where fact is defined in the Gouldian sense of something that's so well established that it's not worth questioning any more.) Yes, of course there's some place deep in our brains where we retain a smidgen of doubt, but the practice of good science demands that it stay down deep unless some contrary evidence comes along. We'll only dredge it up when we're playing with philosophers.

and possibly David Harmon:

A basic part of being a scientist is being able to suspend your beliefs. Not your disbelief -- that's easy -- but your beliefs, and especially the ones you actually like!

since I take it the suggestion here is that a serious scientist ought to be able to set the YEC aside. These responses seem to fit with a picture of scientific knowledge production that looks like this:

For the record, if you'd rather switch the order of "Believe that P" and "Conclude P" boxes (and similarly with the corresponding not-P boxes), that's OK with me. The important feature here is that the empirical evidence, theories, and inferences lead to something you think is properly identified as a belief -- and that believing the opposite of what the data/theory/inference process directs you to believe would be an astoundingly bad thing to do.

Other commenters seemed willing to say that even if the real Marcus Ross is not someone they'd want to call a good scientist, doppelganger-Ross might be able to do good science despite his YEC beliefs. This group included Paul Schofield:

... what does a belief matter to the work done? Surely what goes on inside your own head only becomes a problem if it goes beyond that and influences your work and writings. ...

In the case of the hypothetical here, the belief is kept entirely detached from the work produced (otherwise there would have been no way any PhD, or science fair sticker for that matter, could have been awarded). It would be no different to an atheist making an argument to Christians that referred to the bible. You may not believe it is true, but that doesn't stop you understanding the others viewpoint and using it to make arguments.

and Janne:

What he "actually" believes is of course rather unrelated to how his work should be evaluated. ...

What matters is the quality of the work and the evidence he brings forth in it. The rest is really irrelevant.

and Lab Lemming:

A person who can solve problems is a scientist. ... Science is an outcome-based activity. If it works, it works. Whether or not he is delusional is irrelevant, as long as his work is transparent and reproducible.

These responses suggest a picture of scientific knowledge production that looks like this:

The only difference between this picture and the last one is that there are no boxes that have to do with whether you believe P or not-P. In other words, what you conclude in this process is determined by the data/theory/inference process -- not by whay you believe. If this is a good picture of how scientists arrive at their conclusions, then it's at least possible for a scientist to conclude P (on the basis of the data/theory/inference process) while believing (for entirely separate reasons that he himself recognizes as non-scientific) not-P. Because "Believe not-P" isn't part of this process, it's not going to bring you to a scientific conclusion of not-P.

If you're a serious Popperian you might worry about those conclusion boxes, given the possibility of new data or updates in our theories or the persistence of the problem of induction. A real Popperian keeps riding the data/theory/inference merry-go-round. That's fine; read "Conclude P" as "TENTATIVELY conclude P" and, in the case of new information that could undermine that conclusion (and we promise, Sir Karl, that we'll keep looking for that information!), revisit the available data and theories to draw the best available inference. This is the kind of thing Larry Moran is pointing to with the possibility of "contrary evidence" above. However, he's acknowledging that actual scientists don't keep beating that (tentatively) dead horse as long as Popper makes it sound like they should.

Scientists, of course, are human. As such, they have beliefs, and there's nothing wrong with that. The question is whether there is, or ought to be, a certain kind of relationship between their beliefs and their scientific conclusions.

The sense I'm getting from some of the comments is that people are deeply suspicious that a person could come to the scientific conclusion that P if that person holds a belief that not-P. There are all sorts of efforts scientists take to remove bias from their scientific work, to shift the burden of proof so that they won't give an unfair advantage in their interpretation of the data to the view they're predisposed to believe. Sure, it's hard to completely remove your own individual biases, but that's why scientists build knowledge in communities. It doesn't become knowledge until you can persuade the others in that community of your conclusions, and how you do that is by displaying the data/theory/inference used to arrive at those conclusions.

Maybe whether a particular scientist working within the community can be sufficiently unbiased to contribute to the building of good knowledge is an empirical question. How the community would judge whether his conclusions were biased or unbiased, though, would probably come down to the data/theory/inference displayed to back up the conclusions. This is not to say that a belief that not-P couldn't be the relevant cause of the biased conclusions, but rather that that belief is not the thing the community needs to trip over to identify that the conclusions are biased.

But perhaps the worry is really something like this: A real scientist ought only to believe conclusions reached through an appropriate data/theory/inference process. This would mean that scientific conclusions ought properly to smash any beliefs you have that contradict them. It would not be acceptable, on this view, to say, "I know my belief that P is not scientifically supported! I understand that there's no reason for anyone in the scientific community to take my belief that P as a scientific conclusion, and I have no intention of asserting it as such, whether to other scientists or to non-scientists. Yet, in my heart of hearts, I believe that P."

Again, there's probably an empirical question about whether it's really possible for humans to hold contradictory beliefs. But, must all of a scientist's beliefs be on solid empirical footing? Can any human actually live up to this standard (without simplifying the problem by believing very few things)?

Believe me, I understand the consternation around the actual Marcus Ross. I will be the first one to decry any arguments-from-the-authority-of-having-a-geosciences-Ph.D. offered to defend YEC, as well as any silly claims that his being a scientist and his believing YEC means that YEC constitutes a set of scientific beliefs.

But, it seems to me that the aim of the scientific enterprise is to find ways to draw inferences that move beyond the beliefs of any individual scientist. Leaving the "belief" boxes out of the flowchart doesn't seem to remove any of the steps required for building sound scientific conclusions. Scientific conclusions may well affect the belief structures of individual scientists, but that's a matter of their own personal growth, not required step in the construction of the shared body scientific knowledge.

___________
*"You're using hand drawn flowcharts?!" exclaims my better half. Yes, I am. Now you all know what a Luddite I am. Please excuse me while I churn some butter.

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Chris Street blog stats

Over the past 30 days i've reviewed 5166 Google Reader items. Of these Ive blogged 126 times or <2.4% of items.

Its less than 2.4% because not all blogs arise from Google Reader feeds. Other sources of news etc include (in the last few days) Clipmarks.com and non RSS Feed sources such as New Scientist paper magazine.

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